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Abstract. With the arrival of the European Union’s General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), several companies are making signicant changes to their
systems to achieve compliance. The changes range from modifying privacy poli-
cies to redesigning systems which process personal data. This work analyzes the
privacy policies of large-scaled cloud services which seek to be GDPR compliant.
The privacy policy is the main medium of information dissemination between
the data controller and the users. We show that many services that claim compli-
ance today do not have clear and concise privacy policies. We identify several
points in the privacy policies which potentially indicate non-compliance; we
term these GDPR vulnerabilities. We identify GDPR vulnerabilities in ten cloud
services. Based on our analysis, we propose seven best practices for crafting
GDPR privacy policies.
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1 Introduction
Security, privacy, and protection of personal data have become complex and abso-
lutely critical in the Internet era. Large scale cloud infrastructures like Facebook have
focused on scalability as one of the primary goals (as of 2019, there are 2.37 billion
monthly active users on facebook [11]), leaving security and privacy on the backseat.
This is evident from the gravity of personal data breaches reported over the last decade.
For instance, the number of signicant data breaches at U.S. businesses, government
agencies, and other organizations was over 1,300 in 2018, as compared to fewer than
500, ten years ago [4]. The magnitude of impact of such breaches are huge; for exam-
ple, the Equifax breach [19] compromised the nancial information of ∼145 million
consumers. In response to the alarming rise in the number of data breaches, the Euro-
pean Union (EU) adopted a comprehensive privacy regulation called the General Data
Protection Regulation (GDPR) [25].
At the core of GDPR is a new set of rules and regulations, aimed at providing the
citizens of the EU, more control over their personal data. Any company or organiza-
tion operational in the EU and dealing with the personal data of EU citizens is legally
bound by the laws laid by GDPR. GDPR-compliant services must ensure that personal
data is collected legally for a specic purpose, and are obliged to protect it from mis-
use and exploitation; failure to do so, might result in hefty penalties for the company.
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As of Jan 2019, 91 reported nes have been imposed under the new GDPR regime
[16]. The magnitude of ne imposed varies by the severity of non-compliance. For
instance, in Germany, a e20,000 ne was imposed on a company for failing to hash
employee passwords, resulting in a security breach. Whereas the French data protec-
tion authority ned Google e50 million for not properly disclosing to users how data
is collected across its services to present personalized advertisements. A series of law-
suits and nes have now forced companies to take a more privacy-focused future for
their services [9].
While our prior work examined how GDPR aects the design and operation of In-
ternet companies [27] and its impact on storage systems [26], this work focuses on a
third dimension : privacy policies (PP). A privacy policy is a statement or a legal docu-
ment (in privacy law) that discloses the ways a party gathers, uses, discloses, and man-
ages a customer or client’s data [13]. The key to achieving transparency, one of the six
fundamental data protection principles laid out by GDPR, is a clear and concise PP that
informs the users how their data is collected, processed, and controlled. We analyze
the privacy policies of ten large-scale cloud services that operate in the EU and claim
to be GDPR-compliant; we identify several GDPR vulnerabilities, points in the PP that
could potentially lead to non-compliance with GDPR. Some of the vulnerabilities we
identify are clear-cut non-compliance (e.g., not providing details about the Data Pro-
tection Ocer), while others lie in grey areas and are up for interpretation. However,
based on the prior history of nes levied on charges of GDPR non-compliance [16], we
believe there is a strong chance that all identied vulnerabilities may lead to charges.
Our analysis reveals that most PP are not clear and concise, sometimes exploiting
the vague technical specications of GDPR to their benet. For instance, Bloomberg, a
software tech company states in its PP that "Bloomberg may also disclose your personal
information to unaliated third parties if we believe in good faith that such disclosure is
necessary [...]", with no mention of who the third-parties are and how to object to such
disclosure and processing. Furthermore, we identify several vulnerabilities in the PP
that indicate potential non-compliance with GDPR. First, many services exhibit all-
or-none behaviors with respect to user controls over data oftentimes requiring with-
drawal from the service to enable deletion of any information, or to raise objections
to data processing. Second, most controllers bundle the purposes for data collection
and processing amongst various entities. They collect multiple categories of user data,
each on a dierent platform and state a bunch of purposes for which they, or their
Aliates could use this data. We believe this is in contradiction to GDPRs goals of
attaching a purpose to every piece of collected personal information.
Based on our study, we propose seven policy recommendations that a GDPR-
compliant company should address in their PP. The proposed policy considerations
correspond to the categories of data collected, their purpose, the lawfulness of pro-
cessing them, etc. We accompany each consideration with the GDPR article that ne-
cessitates it and where applicable, provide an example of violation of this policy by
one of the systems under our study.
Our analysis is not without limitations. First, while we studied a wide category of
cloud-services ranging from social media to education, our study is not exhaustive;
we do not analyze categories like healthcare, entertainment, or government services.
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Second, we do not claim to identify all vulnerabilities in each PP we analyzed. De-
spite these limitations, our study contributes useful analyses of privacy policies and
guidelines for crafting GDPR-compliant privacy policies.
2 GDPR and Privacy Policy
GDPR The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) came into eect on May 25th
2018 as the legal framework that sets guidelines for the collection and processing of
personal information of people in the European Union (EU) [25]. The primary goal
of GDPR is to ensure protection of personal data by vesting the control over data in
the users themselves. Therefore, the data subject (the person whose personal data is
collected) has the power to demand companies to reveal what information they hold
about the user, object to processing his data, or request to delete his data held by the
company. GDPR puts forth several laws that a data collector and processor must abide
by; such entities are classied either as data controller, the entity that collects and uses
personal data, or as a data processor, the entity that processes personal data on behalf
of a data controller, and the regulations may vary for the two entities.
Key policies of GDPR. The central focus of GDPR is to provide the data subjects ex-
tensive control over their personal data collected by the controllers. Companies that
wish to stay GDPR-compliant must take careful measures to ensure protection of user
data by implementing state-of-the-art techniques like pseudonymization and encryp-
tion. They should also provide the data subjects with ways to retrieve, delete, and raise
objections to the use of any information pertaining to them. Additionally, the compa-
nies should appoint supervisory authorities like the Data Protection Ocer (DPO) to
oversee the company’s data protection strategies and must notify data breaches within
72 hours of rst becoming aware of it. Failure to comply to GDPR can result in hefty
nes; up to 4% of the annual global turnover of the company.
Impact of GDPR. Several services shut down completely, while others blocked ac-
cess to the users in the European Union(EU) in response to GDPR. For instance, the
need for infrastructural changes led to the downfall of several multiplayer games in
the EU, including Uber Entertainment’s Super Monday Night Combat and Gravity In-
teractive’s Ragnarok Online [15], whereas the changes around user consent for data
processing resulted in the shut down of advertising companies like Drawbridge [7].
Furthermore, 91 reported nes have been imposed under the new GDPR regime as of
January 2019, with charges as high as e50 million [16].
GDPR and privacy policy. A privacy policy is a statement or a legal document (in
privacy law) that discloses some or all of the ways a party gathers, uses, discloses, and
manages a customer or client’s data [13,24]. It is the primary grounds for transparent
data processing requirements set forth by GDPR. GDPR G12 sets the ground for trans-
parency, one of the six fundamental principles of GDPR. It states that any information
or communication to the users must be concise, transparent, intelligible and in an eas-
ily accessible form, using clear and plain language. The main objective of this article
is to ensure that users are aware of how their data is collected, used, and processed.
Therefore, the rst step towards GDPR compliance at the controllers is updating the
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privacy policy, which is the primary information notice board between the controller
and the customer.
3 Best Practices for GDPR compliant Privacy Policies
GDPR has six general data protection principles (transparency; purpose limitation;
data minimization; accuracy; storage limitation; and condentiality) with data pro-
tection by design and default at the core. The rst step to implementing these data-
protection principles is to conceptualize an accurate privacy policy at the data con-
troller.
Privacy policy documents issued by data controllers are oftentimes overlooked
by customers either because they are too lengthy and boring, or contain too many
technical jargons. For instance, Microsoft’s privacy policy is 56 pages of text [22],
Google’s privacy policy spans 27 pages of textual content [17], and Facebook’s data
policy document is 7 pages long [10]. A Deloitte survey of 2,000 consumers in the U.S
found that 91% of people consent to legal terms and service conditions without reading
them [5].
Privacy policies of GDPR-compliant systems must be specic about the sharing
and distribution of user data to third- parties, with ne-grained access control rights
to users. On the contrary, Apple iCloud’s privacy policy reads as follows [20] : [...]
You acknowledge and agree that Apple may, without liability to you, access, use, preserve
and/or disclose your Account information and Content to law enforcement authorities,
government ocials, and/or a third party, as Apple believes is reasonably necessary or
appropriate [...] . While this contradicts the goals of GDPR, this information is men-
tioned on the 11th page of a 20 page long policy document, which most customers
would tend to skip.
These observations put together, emphasizes the need for a standardized privacy-
policy document for GDPR-compliant systems. We translate GDPR articles into precise
questions that a user must nd answer to, while reading any privacy policy. An ideal
privacy policy for a GDPR-complaint system should at the least, answer all of the
following questions prexed withP. The GDPR law that corresponds to the question
is prexed with G.
(P1) : Processing Entities. Who collects the user data and who are the users of data
(G5(1)B, 6, 21).
The PP of a GDPR-compliant controller must precisely state the sources of data,
and with whom the collected data is shared. While many controllers vaguely state that
they "may share the data with third-parties", GDPR requires specifying who the third
parties are, and for what purpose they would use this data.
(P2) : Data Categories. What personally identiable data is collected (G14, 20)
The controller must clearly state the attributes of personal data (name, email,
phone number, IP etc) being collected or at the least, categories of these attributes.
All the PP we studied fairly addresses this requirement.
(P3) : Retention. When will the collected data expire and be deleted (G5(1)E, 13, 17)
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GDPR requires that the controller attach a retention period or a basis for deter-
mining this retention period to every category of personal data collected for a specic
purpose. Such retention periods or policies must be mentioned straight up in the PP.
Apple’s PP for instance has no mention of how long the collected data will reside in
their servers [1]. It also has no details on whether the user data will ever be deleted
after its purpose of collection is served.
(P4) : Purpose . Why is the data being collected G5(1)B)
Purpose of data collection is one of the main principles of data protection in GDPR.
The PP must therefore clearly state the basis for collection of each category of personal
data and the legal basis for processing it. The controller should also indicate if any data
is obtained from third-parties and the legal basis for processing such data.
(P5) : User Controls. How can the user request the following
a) All the personal data associated with the user along with its source, purpose,
TTL, the list of third-parties to which it has been shared etc (G15)
b) Raise objection to the use of any attribute of their personal data (G21)
c) Personal data to be deleted without any undue delay (G17)
d) Personal data to be transferred to a dierent controller (G20)
Not all PP explicitly state the user’s rights to access and control their personal data.
For instance, Uber has no option to request for deletion of user travel history, without
having to deactivate the account.
(P6) : Data Protection. Does the controller take measures to ensure safety and pro-
tection of data
a) By implementing state-of-the-art techniques such as encryption or pseudonymiza-
tion (G25, 32)
b) By logging all activities pertaining to user data (G30)
c) By ensuring safety measures when processing outside the EU (G3)
GDPR puts the onus of data protection by design and default on the data con-
troller. Additionally, irrespective of the location of processing data at the controller,
they should be clear about the data protection guarantees provided when processed
outside he EU. Additionally, the PP must contain the contact details of the data pro-
tection ocer (DPO) or appropriate channels to request, modify or delete their infor-
mation.
(P7) : Policy Updates. Does the controller notify users appropriately when changes
are made to the privacy policy (G14)
The transparency principle of GDPR advocates that the users must be notied and
be given the chance to review and accept the new terms, whenever changes are made
to policies. On the contrary, many services simply update the date of modication in
the policy document rather than taking measures to reasonably notify the users (for
eg., using email notications).
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Cloud Service P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6 P7
Processing Data Retention Purpose Controls Protection Updates
Bloomberg 7 3 7 3 7 7 7
Onavo 7 3 7 3 7 7 3
Instagram 7 3 7 3 3 7 3
Uber 7 3 3 3 7 7 3
edx 3 3 3 3 7 7 7
Snapchat 3 3 3 3 3 3 7
iCloud 7 3 3 3 3 3 3
Whatsapp 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
FlyBe Airlines 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Metro bank 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
Table 1. GDPRvulnerabilities. The table shows GDPR vulnerabilities across 10 cloud services.
4 Case Studies
In this section we present the case study of ten large-scale cloud services that are oper-
ational in the EU. We analyze various categories of applications and services including
three social media applications like Whatsapp and Instagram to nancial institutions
like Metro bank. We study the privacy policies of each of these services and identify
GDPR vulnerabilities that could lead to potential GDPR non-compliance. Table 1 cat-
egorizes companies in the descending order of GDPR vulnerabilities. The discussion
below is grouped by the type of commonly observed vulnerabilities.
Unclear data sharing andprocessing policies. Instagram, a photo and video-sharing
social networking service owned by Facebook Inc discloses user information to all
its Aliates ( the Facebook group of companies), who can use the information with
no specic user consent [21]. The way in which Aliates use this data is claimed to
be "under reasonable condentiality terms", which is vague. For instance, it is unclear
whether a mobile number that is marked private in the Instagram account, is shared
with, and used by Aliates. This can count towards violation of purpose as the mobile
number was collected primarily for account creation and cannot be used for other pur-
poses without explicit consent. Additionally, Instagram says nothing about the user’s
right to object to data processing by Aliates or third-parties. It’s PP says "Our Service
Providers will be given access to your information as is reasonably necessary to provide
the Service under reasonable condentiality terms". Uber on the other hand, may provide
collected information to its vendors, consultants, marketing partners, research rms,
and other service providers or business partners, but does not specify how the third
parties would use this information [34]. On similar grounds, iCloud’s PP vaguely states
that information may be shared with third-parties, but does not specify who the third-
parties are, and how to opt-out or object to such sharing [20].. Similarly Bloomberg is
vague about third-party sharing and says, "Bloomberg may also disclose your personal
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information to unaliated third parties if we believe in good faith that such disclosure is
necessary [...]" [2].
Vague data retention policies. Instagram does not guarantee that user data is com-
pletely deleted from its servers when a user requests for deletion of personal infor-
mation. Data can remain viewable in cached and archived pages of the service. Fur-
thermore Instagram claims to store the user data for a "reasonable" amount of time
for "backup", after account deletion, with no justication of why it is necessary, and
whether they will continue to use the backup data for processing. Other companies
including Bloomberg and Onavo do not specify a retention period, vaguely specifying
that personal information is retained for as long as is necessary for the purpose for which
it is collected [2, 23].
Un-reasonableways of notifying updates to privacy policy. Changes to PP should
be notied to all users in a timely manner and users must be given the chance to re-
view and accept the updated terms. However, edX, Bloomberg, and Snapchat would
simply "label the Privacy Policy as "Revised (date)[...]. By accessing the Site after any
changes have been made, you accept the modied Privacy Policy and any changes con-
tained therein" [2, 8, 29]. This is un-reasonable as it is easy to miss such notications,
and a better way of notifying users is by sending an email to review the updated policy.
Weak data protection policies. GDPR G37 requires the controller to publish contact
details of the data protection ocer (DPO). The privacy policies of Instagram, Face-
book, Bloomberg and edX have no reference to who the DPO is, or how to contact
them. Similarly, while most cloud services assure users that their data processing will
abide by the terms in the PP irrespective of the location of processing, services like
Onavo take a laidback approach. It simply states that they "may process your informa-
tion, including personally identifying information, in a jurisdiction with dierent data
protection laws than your jurisdiction", with nothing said about the privacy guarantees
in cases of such processing. Some other services like Uber, state nothing about data
protection techniques employed or international transfer policies.
No ne-grained control over user data. The edX infrastructure does not track and
index user data at every place where the user volunteers information of the site. There-
fore, they claim that, "neither edX nor Members will be able to help you locate or manage
all such instances.". Similarly, deleting user information does not apply to "historical ac-
tivity logs or archives unless and until these logs and data naturally ? age-o? the edX
system". It is unclear if such data continues to be processed after a user has requested
to delete his information. Similarly, Uber requires the user to deactivate their account
to delete personal information from the system. Moreover, if a user objects to the us-
age of certain personal information, , " Uber may continue to process your information
notwithstanding the objection to the extent permitted under GDPR". It is unclear to what
extent and on what grounds Uber can ignore the objections raised by users. While
most services provide a clear overview the rights user can exercise and the ways of
doing so by logging into their service, Onavo simply states, "For assistance with exer-
cising rights, you can contact us at support@onavo.com". It does not specify what kind
of objections can be raised, what part of the personal information can be deleted, etc.
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4.1 A good privacy policy
Flybe is a British airlines whose privacy policy was by far the most precise and clear
document of all the services we analyzed [14], probably because it’s based in the EU.
Nonetheless, the eort put by Flybe into providing all necessary information pertain-
ing to the collection and use of customer’s personal data is an indicator of its com-
mitment to GDPR-compliance. For instance, Flybe clearly categorizes types of user
information collected, along with a purpose attached to each category. While most of
the services we analyzed claim to simply share information with third-parties as nec-
essary, Flybe enumerates each of its associated third-parties, the specics of personal
data shared with them, the purpose for sharing and a link to the third-parties privacy
policy. In cases where it is necessary to process user data outside of EU, Flybe ensures
a similar degree of protection as in the EU. We believe that a PP as clear as the one
employed by Flybe, enables users to gain a fair understanding of their data and their
rights over collected data. The level of transparency and accountability demonstrated
by this PP is an indicator of right practice for GDPR-compliance.
4.2 Summary
The major GDPR vulnerabilities we identify in large-scale cloud services can be sum-
marized as follows.
All or nothing. Most companies have rolled out new policies and products to comply
with GDPR, but those policies don’t go far enough. In particular, the way companies
obtain consent for the privacy policies is by asking users to check a box in order to
access services. It is a widespread practice for online services, but it forces users into
an all-or-nothing choice, a violation of the GDPR’s provision around particularized
consent and ne-grained control over data usage. There’s a lawsuit against Google
and Facebook for a similar charge [3].
This behavior extends to other types of user rights that GDPR advocates. For in-
stance, GDPR vests in the users the right to object to the use of a part or all of their
personal data, or delete it. Most controllers however, take the easy approach and en-
able these knobs only if they user un-registers for their service. This approach is not
in the right spirit of GDPR.
Handwavy about data protection. GDPR requires controllers to adopt internal poli-
cies and implement measures which meet in particular ,the principles of data protec-
tion by design and default. However, many cloud services seem to dodge the purpose
by stating that in spite of the security measures taken by them (they do not specify
what particular measures are taken), the user data may be accessed, disclosed, altered,
or destroyed. Whether this is non-compliance is a debatable topic, however, the intent
of GDPR G24 and 25 is to encourage controllers to implement state of the art data
protection techniques.
Purpose Bundling. Most controllers bundle the purposes for data collection and pro-
cessing amongst various entities. They collect multiple categories of user data, each
on a dierent platform and state a bunch of purposes for which they, or their Ali-
ates could use this data. Although this might not be explicit non-compliance, it kills
GDPR’s notion of a purpose attached to every unit of user data collected.
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Unreasonable PrivacyPolicyChangeNotications. Privacy policy being the bind-
ing document based on which a user consents to using a service, any changes to the
policy must be notied to the user in a timely and appropriate manner. This may in-
clude sending an email to all registered users, or in case of a website, placing a noti-
cation pop- up without reading and accepting which, the user cannot browse further.
However, many services we analyzed have unreasonable update policies, where in
they simply update the last modied date in the privacy policy and expect the user to
check back frequently.
4.3 User experiences with exercising GDPR rights in the real world
Privacy policies provide an overview of techniques and strategies employed by the
company to be GDPR-compliant, including the rights that the users could exercise
over their data. While no lawsuit can be led against a company unless there is a proof
for violation of any of the GDPR laws claimed in the PP, this section is an account of
some user’s attempts to exercise the rights claimed in the PP.
A user of Pokemon Go raised an objection to processing her personal data, and to
stop using her personal data for marketing and promotional purposes, both of which
are listed under the user’s rights and choices in Pokemon Go’s PP. The response from
the controller however, was instructions on how to delete the user account [31]. In
another incident, Carl Miller, Research Director at the Centre for the Analysis of Social
Media requested an unnamed company to return all personal data they hold about him
(which is a basic right GDPR provides to a data subject). However, the company simply
responded that they are not the controller for the data he was asking for [33]. Adding
on to this, when a user requests for personal information, the company requires him
to specify what data he needs [32]. This is not in the right spirit of GDPR because,
a user does not know what data a controller might have. This violates the intent of
GDPR because the main idea is to give users a better idea of what data is held about
them.
These real experiences of common people show that GDPR has a long way to go, to
achieve its goal of providing users with knowledge and control over all their personal
information collected and processed by various entities.
5 Discussion
The negative responses received by users trying to exercise their GDPR rights, and
the shut down of several services in the European Union(EU) in response to GDPR,
motivated us to analyze the root cause of this behavior. We identify two prominent
reasons.
First, some companies do not have well informed policies for sharing the collected
data across third-parties, or they rely completely on information from third-parties
for their data. Second, their infrastructure does not support identifying, locating, and
packaging user data in response to user queries. While the former can be resolved
by ensuring careful data sharing policies, the latter requires signicant reworking
of backend infrastructure. Primarily, the need for infrastructural changes led to the
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downfall of several multiplayer games in the EU, including Uber Entertainment’s Su-
per Monday Night Combat, Gravity Interactive’s Ragnarok Online and Dragon Saga
and Valve’s entire gaming community [15]. In this context, we identify 4 primary
infrastructural changes that a backend storage system must support in order to be
GDPR-complaint [26] and suggest possible solutions in each case.
Timely deletion. Under GDPR, no personal data can be retained for an indenite
period of time. Therefore, the storage system should support mechanisms to associate
time-to-live (TTL) counters for personal data, and then automatically erase them from
all internal subsystems in a timely manner. One way to eciently allow deletion is to
maintain a secondary index on TTL like time series databases [12].
Indexing via Metadata. Several articles of GDPR require ecient access to groups of
data based on certain attributes. While traditional databases natively oer this ability
via secondary indices, not all storage systems have ecient or congurable support for
this capability. Several research in the past have explored building ecient multi-index
stores. The common technique used in multi-index stores is to utilize redundancy to
partition each full copy of the data by a dierent key [28, 30].
Monitoring and Logging. GDPR allows the data subject to query the usage pattern
of their data. Therefore, the storage system needs an audit trail of both its internal
actions and external interactions. One way to tackle this problem is to use fast non-
volatile memory devices like 3D Xpoint to store logs. Ecient auditing may also be
achieved through the use of eidetic systems. For example, Arnold is able to remember
past state with only 8% overhead [6].
Access Control and Encryption. As GDPR aims to limit access to personal data
to only permitted entities, for established purposes, and for predened duration of
time, the storage system must support ne-grained and dynamic access control. An
eective way of doing this is to break down user data, and encrypt each attribute using
a dierent public key; an approach commonly termed as Key-Policy Attribute-Based
Encryption (KP-ABE) [18].
6 Conclusion
We analyze the privacy policies of ten large-scale cloud services, identifying vulnera-
bilities that could potentially result in GDPR non-compliance. While our study shows
that many PP are far from clear, we also provide real world examples to show that ex-
ercising user rights claimed in PP is not an easy task. Additionally, we propose seven
recommendations that a PP should address, to be close to GDPR-compliance.
With the growing relevance of privacy regulations around the world, we expect
this paper to trigger interesting conversations around the need for clear and con-
crete GDPR-compliant privacy policies. We are keen to extend our eort to engage
the storage community in addressing the research challenges in alleviating the identi-
ed GDPR vulnerabilities, by building better infrastructural support where necessary.
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